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ARE YOU SIRIUS? THE MISTAKE OF
CONDITIONING APPROVAL OF THE
SIRIUS-XM MERGER ON A PRICE CAP
On July 25, 2008, in a 3–2 decision along party lines, the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) voted to give the
government’s final stamp of approval on the merger of Sirius Satellite
Radio Inc. (Sirius) and XM Satellite Radio Holdings Inc. (XM)
(collectively, the Applicants). 1 The $3.3 billion dollar merger “was one of
the most protracted in U.S. history,” 2 not receiving approval until seventeen
months after it was first proposed. 3 The merger combined “the only entities
authorized by the Commission to provide satellite radio service in the
United States,” 4 leaving just one satellite radio company, the newly merged
Sirius XM Radio Inc., 5 to control the satellite radio frequencies and provide
services to over 18 million listeners. 6
In reviewing a merger of communication companies, the FCC must
determine whether or not the merger “will serve the public interest,
convenience and necessity.” 7 To determine whether the Sirius-XM merger
was in the public interest, the FCC looked to define the relevant product
and geographic markets but determined that there was insufficient evidence
to do so. 8 Thereafter, the FCC weighed the potential harms and benefits of
the merger under a “worst case scenario” assumption. 9 Although the
Commission admitted that under such a scenario the merged entity would
be a monopoly and have the “incentive and ability to raise the price of
[satellite digital audio radio service (SDARS)],” 10 it determined that
1. Todd Shields, Sirius Satellite Radio Received Clearance from FCC to Buy XM,
BLOOMBERG, July 26, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive
&sid=aNVYmd3DlOfI. This followed the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) approval of the merger.
See Dep’t of Justice, Statement of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division on its Decision to
Close its Investigation of XM Satellite Radio Holding Inc.’s Merger with Sirius Satellite Radio
Inc. (Mar. 24, 2008), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/March/08_at_226.html [hereinafter DOJ
Decision].
2. David Hayes, Sirius – XM Merger’s Approval Opens a New Batch of Questions, KAN.
CITY STAR, Aug. 17, 2008, at D1, available at 2008 WLNR 15499670.
3. Shields, supra note 1.
4. FCC, In re Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses XM Satellite
Radio Holdings Inc., Transferor, to Sirius Satellite Radio Inc., Transferee, 22 F.C.C.R. 12,018,
12,018 (June 27, 2007) [hereinafter FCC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking].
5. See Google Finance, SIRI – Sirius XM Radio Inc., http://finance.google.com/finance?q=
NASDAQ:SIRI (last visited Oct. 3, 2008).
6. Kim Hart, Satellite Radio Merger Approved, WASH. POST, July 26, 2008, available at
2008 WLNR 13925502.
7. 47 C.F.R. § 25.119 (2004).
8. FCC, In re Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses XM Satellite
Radio Holdings Inc., Transferor to Sirius Satellite Radio Inc., Transferee, 25 (Aug. 5, 2008),
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-08-178A1.doc
[hereinafter
FCC
Decision].
9. Id. at 25–26.
10. Id. at 28.
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numerous voluntary commitments made by the Applicants, including a
voluntary price cap, “ameliorate[d] possible harm to consumers” 11 and
rendered the merger “in the public interest.” 12
This note will argue that given the inadequacies of price caps as a
regulatory tool and the high levels of uncertainty regarding the boundaries
of the SDARS market, the FCC erred in approving the Sirius-XM merger
on this basis. Part I of this note will provide a background to the FCC’s
approval of the Sirius-XM merger, including information about the merging
firms and the FCC’s regulatory policy. Part II will argue that the FCC erred
in its reliance on the voluntary price cap because price caps are ineffective,
anti-competitive, and in this situation, a hindrance in light of the uncertainty
problem existing in the SDARS market. Part III will advocate that when
evaluating the merits of mergers between firms in markets whose
boundaries cannot be defined ex ante, regulatory agencies should approve
such mergers on the condition that their decisions be revisited following ex
post evaluation of the merger’s impact. Part IV will conclude this note with
a summary of both the FCC’s missteps in approving the Sirius-XM merger
and how such errors can be avoided in the future.
I. BACKGROUND TO THE FCC’S APPROVAL
A. THE APPLICANTS
Before the merger, Sirius and XM were the sole FCC-licensed
providers of satellite radio programming in the United States. 13 At the time,
XM’s subscriber base exceeded 9 million 14 and its programming consisted
of over 170 channels, including 69 devoted to commercial-free music and
others devoted to broadcasts of Major League Baseball, the National
Hockey League, ESPN, CNN and CNBC, to name a few. 15 XM also
provided services to automobiles through partnerships with automobile
manufacturers, including deals with General Motors, Honda, Hyundai,
Nissan, Porsche, Subaru, Suzuki, and Toyota. 16 Sirius had a subscriber base
of over 8.5 million. 17 It offered the same number of commercial-free music
stations as XM 18 and also had a lineup of other sports, news, talk, and
11. Id.
12. Id. at 26.
13. See XM Radio – Fast Facts, http://xmradio.com/about/fast-facts/index.xmc (last visited

Sept. 28, 2008).
14. Includes only domestic subscribers on the date that the FCC approved the merger. See
FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 6.
15. Id at 6–7.
16. XM Radio – Corporate Information, http://xmradio.com/about/corporate-information.xmc
(last visited Sept. 28, 2008).
17. Sirius Satellite Radio Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 6 (Mar. 31, 2008).
18. See FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 8–9; see also Sirius Satellite Radio – Corporate
Overview, http://www.sirius.com/aboutus (last visited Sept. 28, 2008).
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entertainment programming, featuring Howard Stern, Martha Stewart, the
National Football League, the National Association of Stock Car Auto
Racing, Maxim, ESPN, and coverage of numerous college sports teams. 19
Although both companies had been seeing strong subscriber and revenue
growth, neither had ever turned a profit. 20 This disheartening reality likely
contributed to their desire to merge. 21
B. THE FCC’S INVOLVEMENT IN SATELLITE RADIO
The satellite radio industry is regulated by the FCC under the authority
of the Communications Act of 1934 (the Act). 22 Under the Act, the FCC has
the “sole power to allocate the electromagnetic spectrum, to establish
general guidelines of operations and to grant licenses for use of the
spectrum, which encompasses the entire range of electromagnetic
frequencies transmitting sound, data, and video.” 23 The FCC utilized this
allocation authority on January 18, 1995, when it “allocate[d] spectrum in
the 2310–2360 MHz band for [SDARS].” 24 Subsequently, on March 3,
1997, the FCC determined that it would auction all available spectrum
designated for satellite radio in equal 12.5 MHz pieces to the two highest
bidders. 25 A month later, the Commission announced that XM 26 and Sirius
had been awarded the two SDARS licenses. 27
The FCC established the satellite radio industry while simultaneously
implementing antitrust safeguards. 28 Specifically, the FCC imposed two
important restrictions on the transfer of SDARS licenses. 29 The first of
these restrictions was the prohibition of “transfers or assignments of
19. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 8–9; Sirius Satellite Radio – Corporate Overview, supra
note 18.
20. David Ellis & Paul R. La Monica, XM, Sirius Announce Merger, http://money.cnn.com/
2007/02/19/news/companies/xm_sirius/index (last visited Sept. 28, 2008).
21. Joel D. Corriero, Comment, Satellite Radio Monopoly, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 423, 424
(2008).
22. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1996); Corriero, supra note 21, at 425.
23. Aurele Danoff, “Raised Eyebrows” Over Satellite Radio: Has Pacifica Met its Match?, 34
PEPP. L. REV. 743, 748 (2007).
24. FCC, In re Amendment to the Commission’s Rules With Regard to the Establishment and
Regulation of New Digital Audio Radio Services, 10 F.C.C.R. 2310, 2310 (Jan. 18, 1995).
25. See FCC, In re Establishment of Rules and Policies for the Digital Audio Radio Satellite
Service in the 2310-2360 MHz Frequency Band, 12 F.C.C.R. 5754 (Mar. 3, 1997) [hereinafter
Rules and Policies for the Digital Audio Radio Satellite Service].
26. At the time, XM Satellite Radio Holdings Inc. was known as American Mobile Radio
Corporation.
XM
Satellite
Radio
Holdings,
Inc.
–
Company
History,
http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/XM-Satellite-Radio-Holdings-Inc-CompanyHistory.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2008).
27. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 6, 8 (citing FCC, FCC Announces Auction Winners for
Digital Audio Radio Service, 12 F.C.C.R. 18,727, 18,727 (Apr. 2, 1997) [hereinafter FCC
Announces Auction Winners]).
28. Rules and Policies for the Digital Audio Radio Satellite Service, supra note 25, at 5823–
24.
29. Id. at 5823.
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licenses except upon application to the Commission” and upon receiving
the Commission’s approval. 30 Such approval would only be granted upon a
“demonstrat[ion] that the proposed transaction [would] serve the public
interest, convenience, and necessity pursuant to [§] 310(d) of the Act.” 31
The second restriction on transfers completely prohibited SDARS license
holders from transferring their SDARS licenses to each other. 32 This
restriction was implemented to “help assure sufficient continuing
competition in the provision of [SDARS].” 33
C. FCC’S REVIEW OF THE PROPOSED MERGER
Despite the above prohibition on mergers between them, XM and Sirius
entered into an Agreement and Plan of Merger on February 19, 2007 and
asked for the FCC’s consent to transfer their respective SDARS licenses. 34
In order to reach a decision on the merger, the FCC had to address two
questions. The first question concerned whether the 1997 rule prohibiting
the two SDARS license holders from acquiring each other’s license
constituted a binding rule. 35 If the prohibition was binding, then the second
question the FCC had to answer was whether to “waive, modify, or repeal
the transfer prohibition” if it found that the merger met the Commission’s
standard of review. 36
1. Standard of Review
The FCC’s standard for reviewing mergers in the communications
industry is articulated in § 310(d) of the Act. 37 This standard states that
station licenses shall not be transferred “except . . . upon finding by the
Commission that the public interest, convenience, and necessity will be
served thereby.” 38 To such end, the FCC employs a balancing test,
“weighing any potential public interest harms . . . against any potential
public interest benefits.” 39 Applicants bear the burden of proof under this
30. Id.; See also 47 C.F.R. § 25.119.
31. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 5 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (1996)).
32. Rules and Policies for the Digital Audio Radio Satellite Service, supra note 25, at 5823,

repealed by FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 75–76.
33. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 78.
34. Id. at 2–3, 11.
35. Id. at 14–15; see also Rules and Policies for the Digital Audio Radio Satellite Service,
supra note 25, at 78, repealed by FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 75–76.
36. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 15.
37. 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (1996); FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 16–17.
38. 47 U.S.C. § 310(d). This standard differs from the standard of review used by the Antitrust
Division of the DOJ, which the DOJ employed when it decided to close its investigation of the
merger between XM and Sirius. See generally DOJ Decision, supra note 1. “The DOJ reviews
communications mergers and transactions pursuant to [§] 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits
mergers that may substantially lessen competition in any line of commerce.” FCC Decision,
supra note 8, at 16 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1996)).
39. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 17.
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standard. 40 Therefore, Sirius and XM needed to prove, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that the merger would, on balance, advance the public
interest. 41
In evaluating whether a merger is in the public interest, the FCC heavily
considers whether competition in the relevant markets will be “preserv[ed]
and enhanc[ed].” 42 The relevant product and geographic markets are the
two markets evaluated to determine the horizontal effects of any merger. 43
These markets are typically delineated by the FCC in accordance with the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC)
Horizontal Merger Guidelines by use of the small but significant and
nontransitory increase in price (SSNIP) test. 44 Under the SSNIP test, the
relevant product market is defined as “the smallest group of competing
products for which a hypothetical monopoly provider of the products would
profitably impose” a price increase. 45 Similarly, the relevant geographic
market is defined as “a region such that a hypothetical monopolist that was
the only present or future producer of the relevant product at locations in
that region would profitably impose at least a[n] [SSNIP].” 46
It is important to carefully define the product and geographic markets
because horizontal mergers eliminate competition between the merging
entities, in addition to reducing overall competition in the relevant
markets. 47 Where competition is eliminated and higher concentrations of
market power result, the public faces a real threat of price increases. 48 This
threat arises from the fact that “[c]ompetition among firms indisputably
creates powerful incentives for sellers to take steps to attract customers,
most obviously by keeping prices low.” 49 Without competitive pressure, the
incentive to keep prices low will be diminished or completely eliminated. 50
The remaining firms will have more market power, giving them “the ability
profitably to maintain prices above competitive levels for a significant
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 17–18; see also 47 U.S.C. § 521(6) (1984) (One purpose of the statute, among others,

is to “promote competition in cable communications and minimize unnecessary regulation”). The
FCC also has a “deeply rooted preference for . . . accelerating private sector deployment of
advanced services, ensuring a diversity of information sources and services to the public, and
generally managing the spectrum in the public interest.” FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 17–18.
43. DOJ and FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, rev. Apr. 8, 1997, §§ 1.1, 1.2,
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf [hereinafter Horizontal Merger Guidelines].
44. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 20; Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 43, §§ 1.1,
1.2 (emphasis removed).
45. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 20 (citing Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 43, §
1.11).
46. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 43, § 1.21.
47. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 20.
48. Id.
49. Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation, 74
ANTITRUST L.J. 575, 577 (2007).
50. See generally Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 43, § 0.1.
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period of time.” 51 However, market power usually cannot be determined
without first defining the boundaries of the markets themselves, 52 which is
why defining the product and geographic markets is an important step.
2. The FCC’s Conclusions
The FCC was asked to weigh conflicting opinions and evidence on the
boundaries of the product market for SDARS. 53 The Applicants argued for
a broad definition of the market, their contention being that satellite radio
companies are in competition not just with other satellite radio companies
but with other “audio entertainment services” as well, including “terrestrial
radio, HD Radio, wireless phones, iPods and other MP3 players.” 54
Commenters and petitioners who opposed the merger 55 argued “that
SDARS constitutes a distinct relevant product market, separate from other
audio entertainment services.” 56
After weighing the arguments made by both sides, the FCC determined
that there was insufficient evidence “to delineate the boundaries of the
relevant product market with any precision or confidence.” 57 Moreover, the
FCC was unable to conduct its own analysis of the relevant product market
due to the fact that “there ha[d] been little or no variation in prices;” since
the industry’s launch, XM changed its price one time, Sirius never changed
its price, and terrestrial radio has always been free of charge. 58
Consequently, “without knowing the contours of the relevant product
market,” it also became impossible for the FCC to determine the boundaries
of the relevant geographic market. 59
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id. at § 1.
FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 21–25.
Id. at 21.
Interested parties were permitted to “file petitions to deny, comments, or informal
comments” with the FCC concerning the Sirius-XM merger “no later than July 9, 2007.” Public
Notice, FCC MB Docket No. 07-57 (June 8, 2007), http://www.fcc.gov/transaction/xmsirius.html. Commenters who opposed the merger included the Consumer Coalition for
Competition in Satellite Radio, the National Association of Broadcasters, American Women in
Radio and Television, the National Association of Telecommunications Officers and Advisors, the
American Antitrust Institute, Blue Sky Services, Entravision Communications Corporation, the
Prometheus Radio Project, U.S. Senator Herb Kohl (Chairman of the Subcommittee on Antitrust,
Competition Policy, and Consumer Rights), and U.S. Representatives James T. Walsh and John
McHugh. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 21 n.141.
56. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 21.
57. Id. at 22. It did not help the FCC that the DOJ had not defined the relevant product market
in its own analysis. See DOJ Decision, supra note 1. It also did not help that no commenters
provided price estimates, cross-price elasticities of demand, or conclusive evidence that terrestrial
radio is a substitute for SDARS. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 21–24.
58. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 22.
59. Id. at 25. The inability to determine the product market meant that it was impossible to
determine the geographic market. This result can be seen in the following illustration: “[I]f the
relevant product market were limited to SDARS, [the FCC] could define the relevant geographic
market as a national market. In contrast, if the relevant product market were to include terrestrial
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Without definitions of the product and geographic markets, the FCC
was forced to assume a “worst-case scenario” in evaluating potential
competitive harms. 60 This required assuming that SDARS constituted a
distinct product market and that the United States constituted the
geographic market. 61 Under this scenario, the FCC found that there were no
potential entrants that could have reduced the merged entity’s market
power 62 and that “the proposed merger [was] a merger to monopoly” that
would have “the incentive and ability to raise prices.” 63 Other potential
harms the FCC found were that the merger “would create a vertical
monopoly in the manufacturing and distribution of satellite radio
receivers” 64 and that it could “result in reduced programming diversity.” 65
Despite finding that these harms outweighed any potential benefits of
the merger, 66 the FCC held that the merger was in the public interest
because of voluntary commitments made by Sirius and XM. 67 First, to deal
with the FCC’s concern about reduced program diversity, Sirius and XM
made voluntary commitments to offer new programming packages that
would result in “greater consumer choice” and “two a la carte offerings to
subscribers.” 68 The FCC recognized both of these programming decisions
as beneficial to the public interest. 69 Second, to deal with the FCC’s
concern that the merger “would create a vertical monopoly in the
manufacturing and distribution of satellite radio receivers,” 70 Sirius and XM
voluntarily committed to develop interoperable receivers, 71 and to “permit
any device manufacturer to develop equipment that can deliver the
combined entity’s satellite radio service.” 72 There were several additional

radio, [the FCC] would need to adopt a more localized relevant geographic market to reflect the
fact that terrestrial radio stations have a limited reach.” Id.
60. Id. at 25–26.
61. Id. at 26.
62. There were no potential entrants because the entire spectrum had already been distributed
between Sirius and XM, it would have taken years for another company to build up the necessary
infrastructure, and there were no “uncommitted entrants.” Id. at 26–27. For a discussion about
“uncommitted entrants,” see Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 43, § 1.32.
63. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 27, 28.
64. Id. at 30. This vertical monopoly would adversely impact the public by giving the merged
entity monopoly pricing power over SDARS receivers and would create “the potential of harming
consumers by dampening innovation in the[ir] manufacture.” Id. at 32.
65. Id. at 33–34.
66. Id. at 44–46.
67. Id. at 46.
68. Id. at 38–42.
69. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 39, 41.
70. Id. at 30.
71. Id. at 56. An interoperable receiver would allow consumers to access both Sirius and XM’s
SDARS systems from a single receiver instead of needing a separate receiver for each system. See
id. at 50.
72. Id. at 59.
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voluntary commitments made by Sirius and XM, 73 but the commitment
most significant to the FCC’s decision to approve the merger was the price
cap.
To address concerns about potential price increases to consumers,
Sirius and XM voluntarily committed not to raise retail prices for thirty-six
months. 74 The FCC concluded that this commitment would “mitigate the
harm from any post-merger price increases,” but it wanted additional
protections. 75 Thus, the FCC accepted the Applicants’ price cap
commitment but also retained the authority to evaluate the price cap six
months prior to its expiration to determine if it should be “modified,
removed, or extended.” 76 In addition, the FCC mandated that the Applicants
would not be permitted to adjust the number of channels in any of their
current packages during the three-year price cap period. 77
After finding that the voluntary commitments made by the Applicants
tipped the balance of harms and benefits toward the latter, the FCC turned
its attention to the legality of the merger. 78 When the FCC established the
rules and policies for the SDARS industry in 1997, in order to “help assure
sufficient continuing competition in the provision of [SDARS],” the FCC
devised a rule which stated, “[e]ven after [SDARS] licenses are granted,
one licensee will not be permitted to acquire control of the other remaining
[SDARS] license.” 79 The FCC sought comment as to whether this language
constituted a binding rule and, if so, whether it should be “waive[d],
modif[ied], or repeal[ed] . . . in the event that the Commission determine[d]
that the proposed merger, on balance, would serve the public interest.” 80
While the Commission concluded that the rule was in fact binding, the
Commission also made the decision to repeal the rule since the public
interest would be served. 81
II. THE MISTAKE OF RELYING ON A VOLUNTARY PRICE CAP
The merits of price cap commitments have been hotly contested by U.S.
antitrust regulatory authorities as of late. While the FCC has rejected the

73. Sirius and XM made additional voluntary commitments to allow third party access to
SDARS capacity, to reserve channels for noncommercial use, and to provide service to Puerto
Rico. Id. at 60–68.
74. This commitment applies to the basic $12.95 per month subscription package and the a la
carte programming package, among others. Id. at 47.
75. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 48.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 73–79.
79. Rules and Policies for the Digital Audio Radio Satellite Service, supra note 25, at 5823,
repealed by FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 75–76.
80. FCC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 4, at 12,018.
81. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 73–76.
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use of pricing plans as recently as 2002 82 and the legality of instituting such
plans has been doubted, 83 price cap commitments were embraced by the
FCC in a more recent decision as a way of curbing the potential anticompetitive effects of mergers on pricing. 84 On the other hand, the DOJ and
FTC have vehemently opposed the use of post-merger price regulations. 85
Whether or not there is sufficient justification for the implementation of
voluntary price caps in general, in the specific setting of the Sirius-XM
merger, it is clear that the arguments against the post-merger price
regulation far outweigh the potential public interest benefits found by the
members of the FCC.
A serious uncertainty problem exists in the SDARS industry: there is
insufficient data to determine the boundaries of the product and geographic
markets. 86 Commenters submitted arguments for and against the merger but
neither side could provide conclusive evidence as to the exact market
boundaries. 87 It did not help that throughout their combined histories, Sirius
and XM changed their retail prices a grand total of one time, making it
impossible to estimate the elasticities of demand required to define the
markets. 88 Thus, the FCC’s decision to rely on the Applicants’ voluntary
price cap has three main flaws: (1) price caps have proven to be ineffective;
(2) price caps are anti-competitive; and (3) in this situation, the price cap
eliminated the FCC’s ability to resolve the uncertainty problem that the
SDARS industry faces.
A. INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE PRICE CAP
The price cap proposed by the Applicants and accepted by the FCC
creates a 36-month period during which the Applicants cannot raise their
82. See FCC, In re Application of EchoStar Communications Corporation, (A Nevada
Corporation), General Motors Corporation, and Hughes Electronics Corporation (Delaware
Corporations) (Transferors) and EchoStar Communications Corporation (a Delaware
Corporation) (Transferee), 17 F.C.C.R. 20,559, 20,663 (2002) [hereinafter EchoStar].
83. See Farrell Malone & J. Gregory Sidak, Should Antitrust Consent Decrees Regulate PostMerger Pricing?, 3 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 471, 484–90 (2007) (arguing that price regulation
through consent decree may be unlawful because there is no clear legislative authority to do so
and that it also might be an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers); see also J.
Gregory Sidak & Hal J. Singer, Evaluating Market Power with Two-Sided Demand and
Preemptive Offers to Dissipate Monopoly Rent: Lessons for High-Technology Industries from the
Antitrust Division’s Approval of the XM-Sirius Satellite Radio Merger, 4 J. COMPETITION L. &
ECON. 697, 748–49 (2008) (stating that “Congress has not delegated to the FCC the power to
regulate SDARS rates, and no delegation can be inferred”).
84. See FCC, In re AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corporation Application for Transfer of Control,
22 F.C.C.R. 5662, 5807–08 (2007) (the FCC accepted the voluntary commitment made by AT&T
and BellSouth to offer a fixed $10 price per month for DSL service to new customers and to
continue that policy for 30 months).
85. See discussion infra Part II.B.
86. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 22, 25.
87. Id. at 20–25. Public comments regarding the merger were filed pursuant to the FCC’s
Public Notice of June 8, 2007, supra note 55.
88. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 21–22.
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prices on some specifically enumerated programming packages. 89 History
shows that this regulation will prove to be ineffective during this 36-month
period because (1) the price cap fails to account for non-retail pricing, and
(2) Sirius-XM will have an incentive to reduce its programming quality. In
addition, the price cap will fail to effectively prevent monopoly pricing
behavior since the Applicants will have the ability to raise prices once the
price cap expires.
1. Not All Pricing Elements Were Taken Into Account
One of the shortcomings of the price cap is that it “suffers from a
myopic perception of satellite radio pricing.” 90 The voluntary commitment
to cap retail prices applies to several explicitly enumerated programming
packages. 91 What it fails to account for, however, are the numerous other
“implicit pricing elements of the service, such as equipment subsidies,
ancillary services, activations fees, terminations fee, and transfer fees” 92
(Implicit Pricing Elements). As a result, the Applicants can simply raise the
prices they currently charge for these Implicit Pricing Elements to
compensate for their inability to price-gouge consumers on retail pricing. 93
For example, Sirius currently charges a retail fee of $12.95 per month 94 and
an activation fee of $15.00. 95 In this example, Sirius decides that, with the
monopoly power it obtained in the merger with XM, it would like to
increase retail prices from $12.95 per month to $13.95 per month; however,
the retail price cap implemented by the FCC prevents Sirius from doing so.
Despite the cap, Sirius would still be able to gouge its consumers for the
extra $1.00 per month. Sirius could do so simply by increasing its uncapped
one-time activation fee from $15.00 to $27.00, thus realizing the same
$12.00 gain that year as it would have if the price cap had not prevented it
from raising its monthly retail price. The failure to cap activation fees and
the other Implicit Pricing Elements in conjunction with the cap on retail
prices thus “undermine[s] the consumer protection intent of the price cap” 96
and the FCC’s entire premise for approving the merger.

89. This list includes their “per month subscription package, their a la carte programming
package, their ‘best of both’ programming packages, their ‘mostly music’ and their ‘news, sports,
and talk’ programming packages, and their discounted family-friendly programming package.”
Id. at 47.
90. Id. at 99 (Adelstein, Comm’r, dissenting).
91. Id. at 47.
92. Id. at 99–100 (Adelstein, Comm’r, dissenting); see also Sidak & Singer, supra note 83, at
746, 751.
93. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 99–100 (Adelstein, Comm’r, dissenting); Sidak & Singer,
supra note 83, at 746.
94. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 47.
95. Sirius Terms and Conditions, http://shop.sirius.com (last visited Dec. 21, 2008).
96. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 99–100 (Adelstein, Comm’r, dissenting).
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2. Decrease in Quality of Programming is a Likely Result
As was previously noted, the voluntary commitment consists of an
agreement not to raise the prices on specifically enumerated programming
packages, 97 and the Applicants also cannot change the number of channels
in any of these packages. 98 These regulations, however, do nothing to
inhibit the Applicants’ ability to reduce the quality of their programming
packages by increasing advertising or by moving popular shows to
uncapped packages for which they could charge more money. The Chief
Executive Officer of Sirius, Mel Karmazin, has already stated that “the
advertising line is going to contribute significantly in the future towards
[average revenue per user],” 99 hinting that increased advertising is on the
way. The DOJ has come out against the use of conduct remedies 100
specifically for this very reason, stating:
Conduct remedies suffer from at least four potential substantial costs that a
structural remedy can in principle avoid . . . [for instance], there are the
indirect costs associated with efforts by the merged firm to evade the
remedy’s “spirit” while not violating its letter. As one example, a
requirement that the merged firm not raise price may lead it profitably,
and inefficiently, to reduce its costs by cutting back on quality — thereby
effecting an anticompetitive increase in the “quality adjusted” price. 101

An illustration of the adverse impact that pricing regulations can have
on product quality can be seen in the ongoing regulatory debate concerning
a la carte pricing of television networks on cable and satellite systems. 102
Generally, consumers of television programming advocate a la carte pricing
policies because they believe that they will benefit from only having to pay
for the channels that they watch. 103 Nevertheless, the customary practice for
television providers is to sell channels together in bundles. 104 Research has
shown, despite conventional wisdom, that when a la carte rate regulations
were imposed on cable TV systems, consumers actually suffered rather than
benefited because “cable operators and cable networks responded to these
97. Id. at 47.
98. Id. at 48.
99. Sirius Satellite Radio Inc. & XM Satellite Radio Holdings Inc., Transcript of Investor

Conference
Call
(Feb.
20,
2007),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/908937/
000095012307002469/y30604be425.htm.
100. Conduct remedies “entail[] injunctive provisions that would, in effect, manage or regulate
the merged firm’s postmerger business conduct.” DOJ, Antitrust Div., Antitrust Division Policy
Guide to Merger Remedies, Part III (Oct. 2004), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
guidelines/205108.pdf [hereinafter Policy Guide to Merger Remedies].
101. Id. at Part III.A.
102. Sirius and XM have also voluntarily committed to implement an à la carte policy for
SDARS as part of the merger agreement. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 47.
103. Thomas W. Hazlett, Shredding Tiers for A La Carte? An Economic Analysis of Cable TV
Pricing, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 253, 257 (2006).
104. Id. at 262.

524

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 3

constraints by altering the nature, packaging, and quality of video
programming services.” 105 These same adverse consequences can
reasonably be expected from the price caps on Sirius XM Radio Inc.’s
programming packages.
3. Prices Will Rise When the Price Cap Expires
There is yet another question which the 36-month price cap on the
Applicants’ programming packages fails to address: what happens after the
cap expires? It is true that the FCC implemented some precautionary
measures concerning the cap, such as retaining the authority to evaluate the
price cap six months prior to its expiration to determine if it should be
“modified, removed, or extended,” 106 yet there is nothing to prevent the
Applicants from raising prices once the price cap expires. The cap can be
easily overcome, as it literally tells the Applicants on which day they can
increase their retail prices. Furthermore, considering that there are no
potential entrants into the market, 107 there will be no competitive forces to
naturally prevent Sirius XM Radio Inc. from raising its prices. 108
B. PRICE CAPS ARE ANTI-COMPETITIVE
By approving the merger of Sirius and XM in reliance on a price cap,
the FCC majority “assert[ed] that satellite radio consumers will be better
served by a regulated monopoly than by marketplace competition.” 109 Such
a ruling “is antithetical to the deregulatory movement at the FCC over the
past decade” 110 and its governing law, 111 which advocate competition over
regulation.
In 2002, the FCC received an application from EchoStar
Communications Corporation (EchoStar), General Motors Corporation
(GM), and Hughes Electronics Corporation (Hughes), collectively, “to
transfer control of various Commission authorizations, including direct
broadcast satellite (DBS),” to New EchoStar. 112 It was in this opinion that
the FCC stated its policy that market competition is preferable to regulated

105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 258.
FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 48.
Id. at 26–27.
Market entrants are recognized as having the ability to impact post-merger prices. Thus, if
the possibility existed for new firms to enter the SDARS market, then the possibility would have
remained open that firms could enter the market and prevent Sirius-XM, via the forces of
competition, from raising its prices after the expiration of the price cap. See Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, supra note 43, § 3.0.
109. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 96 (Copps, Comm’r, dissenting).
110. Sidak & Singer, supra note 83, at 746.
111. 47 U.S.C. § 521(6).
112. EchoStar, supra note 82, at 20,561. New EchoStar would provide DBS services under the
name DirecTV. Id.
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monopolies. 113 As in the Sirius-XM merger, the EchoStar merger was a
merger that would combine the two largest providers of the service into a
single entity. 114 Another parallel to the Sirius-XM merger was the concern
that if the merger was approved, the newly merged entity, New EchoStar,
would be able to raise prices as a result of increased market power. 115
Particularly, it was feared that New EchoStar “would be able to raise prices
and exploit its dominant position in geographic regions not served by cable
systems.” 116 To combat these concerns, EchoStar, GM, and Hughes
“promise[d] to remedy the merger’s potential anticompetitive effects in
areas not served by cable competitors with a ‘national pricing plan.’” 117
Unlike the FCC of 2008, the FCC of 2002 rejected the proposed
“national pricing plan” as inconsistent with the goals of the FCC. In its
holding, the Commission stated its clear preference for competition over
regulation:
In essence, what Applicants propose is that we approve the replacement of
viable facilities-based competition with regulation. This can hardly be said
to be consistent with either the Communications Act or with contemporary
regulatory policy and goals, all of which aim at replacing, wherever
possible, the regulatory safeguards needed to ensure consumer welfare in
communications markets served by a single provider, with free market
competition, and particularly with facilities-based competition. Simply
stated, the Applicants’ proposed remedy is the antithesis of the 1996 Act’s
“pro-competitive, de-regulatory” policy direction. 118

The FTC and DOJ have similarly objected to the practice of allowing
mergers based on assurances that the merging companies will not raise
prices. Their objections rest “on the grounds that . . . competition is the
proper driving force for policy decisions.” 119 They believe that “community
commitments are an ineffective short-term regulatory approach to what is
ultimately a problem of competition.” 120 Clearly then, the decision of the
FCC to opt in favor of a regulated monopolist, Sirius XM Radio Inc., over
the continued market competition between Sirius and XM, is irreconcilable
with the policies of the FCC, FTC, and DOJ.

113. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 96–97 (Copps, Comm’r, dissenting).
114. EchoStar, supra note 82, at 20,561; FCC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 4, at

12,018.
115. EchoStar, supra note 82, at 20,626.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 20,579.
118. Id. at 20,663 (emphasis removed).
119. Mary Lou Steptoe & David Balto, Finding the Right Prescription: The FTC’s Use of
Innovative Merger Remedies, 10 ANTITRUST 16 (1995).
120. FTC, Improving Health Care: A Dose of Competition, 2004 WL 1685795 (July 2004).
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C. THE UNCERTAINTY PROBLEM
1. Definition of an Uncertainty Problem and How it is
Remedied
Regulatory authorities often make decisions about competition policy in
the face of uncertainty. 121 Uncertainty is created by the fact that in many
situations, there is simply no way to predict the future impact of
implemented policies. 122 When such uncertainty exists, enforcement of
regulatory policies has a certain experimental character that makes the
manner in which remedies are implemented especially important. 123
When an administrative agency has determined that certain conduct
should be regulated, there are two methods available to it to enforce its
standards: ex ante and ex post. 124 Under an ex ante enforcement
mechanism, the administrative agency reviews and must either reject or
provide preapproval or preclearance for the conduct. 125 By contrast, ex post
enforcement involves an evaluation of the conduct after the fact rather than
before it transpires. 126
The ex ante approach to regulation faces serious disadvantages when
uncertainty problems exist in comparison to the ex post approach. 127 Since
ex ante regulation “requires agencies to make enforcement decisions before
the regulated activity has occurred,” regulatory agencies may be forced to
make predictions about future conduct based on “a limited, sometimes
inadequate record.” 128 The regulatory agencies may also be forced to rely
on the applicant’s own description of its proposed conduct in order to
predict the impact of the conduct. 129 This suggests that “in contexts where a
complete record may be especially helpful (or necessary) in identifying
violations or determining their nature or severity,” as when considering
whether a merger will be anticompetitive, “ex ante enforcement may be
inadvisable.” 130 Thus, in the face of uncertainty problems, “waiting to see
what happens, i.e., relying on ex post enforcement, may be the least costly
and error-prone alternative.” 131

121. William E. Kovacic, Evaluating Antitrust Experiments: Using Ex Post Assessments of
Government Enforcement Decisions to Inform Competition Policy, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 843,
844 (2001).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Modes of Regulatory Enforcement and the Problem of Administrative
Discretion, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1275, 1278 (1999).
125. Id. at 1282–83.
126. Id. at 1281–82.
127. Id. at 1319.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Bhagwat, supra note 124, at 1319.
131. Id.
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Despite the advantages of ex post enforcement in the face of
uncertainty, the FCC is required by law to preassess transfers of radio
license control to make sure that the transfer “will serve the public interest,
convenience and necessity.” 132 Since the FCC cannot wait to take ex post
action, the next best option for dealing with uncertainty problems is to
conduct ex post monitoring “to determine whether the assumptions and
hypotheses that motivated the decision[s] . . . were sound.” 133
Research and ex post testing of the decisions made by regulatory
authorities are essential in contexts characterized by uncertainty. 134 The
development of sound government policy that can sufficiently protect the
interests of the public depends on generating knowledge concerning the
“wisdom of choices past,” as it will lead to a better “[u]nderstanding [of]
the effects of previous government initiatives” and allow agencies to gain
“valuable insights about designing future policies.” 135 These studies can
reduce the uncertainty of future decisions by “illuminating the accuracy of
various theories in diagnosing business conduct or predicting competitive
effects and informing judgments about the impact of various remedies.” 136
Studies conducted by the FTC’s Bureau of Economics (Bureau), which
were ex post assessments of several government regulations, are illustrative
examples of how ex post assessments of regulatory decisions can lead to
better policies. 137 One such study was conducted by the Bureau after
Congress passed the Nutrition Education and Labeling Act of 1990
(NLEA). 138 The NLEA allowed companies to make some health claims on
product labels and advertisements but prohibited many others about
promising scientific findings, “even when the downside risk from
consuming foods based on the claims was negligible and the manufacturer
accurately portrayed the level of scientific support for the claims.” 139 The
Bureau investigated the impact of this regulation and found that it
negatively impacted the public by “stifl[ing] the flow of health information
to consumers” and by “result[ing] in significantly less information about
nutrition and health attributes in advertising.” 140 Another of the Bureau’s
studies was conducted to test new mortgage disclosure requirements
proposed by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD). 141 The study found that the requirements would cost consumers
132.
133.
134.
135.

47 C.F.R. § 25.119.
Kovacic, supra note 121, at 846.
Id. at 856.
Id. at 843. See also Luke Froeb, Daniel Hosken & Janis Pappalardo, Economics Research
at the FTC: Information, Retrospectives, and Retailing, 25 REV. INDUS. ORG. 353, 370–71 (2004).
136. Kovacic, supra note 121, at 846–47.
137. See Froeb, Hosken & Pappalardo, supra note 135, at 355–61.
138. Id. at 357.
139. Id. at 357–58.
140. Id. at 358.
141. Id. at 360.
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millions of dollars per year because more people had difficulty determining
the price of loans when the mortgage forms contained the disclosures. 142
The Bureau’s ex post assessments of the FDA and HUD policies
showed the beneficial impact that research can have on regulatory decisions
made in uncertain situations. Neither agency knew how their regulatory
policies would impact the public, but the Bureau’s studies provided
evidence on the consequences of the policies. 143 As a result of the Bureau’s
investigations, the FDA adjusted its policies on health claims in
advertising, 144 and HUD took its proposal to increase mortgage disclosures
off the table. 145
The importance of conducting research to remedy uncertainty problems
in antitrust merger policy is especially pronounced. 146 Ex post assessments
are viewed as “essential to effective government policy” 147 when it comes
to competition, particularly in the face of technological change. 148 These
assessments “allow us to sharpen our understanding of which mergers are
likely (and unlikely) to be anticompetitive.” 149 One prerequisite to
conducting ex post assessments of antitrust merger decisions, though, is the
need for data in order to conduct analyses of mergers’ effects. 150 Qualitative
data, such as documents and testimonials, may be helpful, but it is
quantitative data that economists and lawyers have principally relied on to
conduct these assessments. 151
2. The Price Cap Will Not Resolve the Uncertainty Problem
The FCC, in evaluating the proposed merger between Sirius and XM,
confronted an uncertainty problem. The uncertainty arose from the
insufficiency of information that was needed to establish the product and
geographic markets for SDARS. 152 Specifically, there was insufficient
pricing information to calculate cross-price elasticities of demand. 153 As a
result, the FCC approved the merger under the presumption that the
voluntary commitments made it more likely than not that the merger would
be in the public interest. 154 It also accepted a price cap on Sirius and XM’s
current prices without research as to whether these prices were the most
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 361.
See Froeb, Hosken & Pappalardo, supra note 135, at 358, 361.
Id. at 359.
Id. at 361.
Kovacic, supra note 121, at 843.
Froeb, Hosken & Pappalardo, supra note 135, at 370.
Kovacic, supra note 121, at 843.
Froeb, Hosken & Pappalardo, supra note 135, at 371.
Id. at 366.
Id. at 366–67.
FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 22, 25.
Thomas W. Hazlett, Some Dynamics of High-Tech Merger Analysis in General and with
Respect to XM-Sirius, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 753, 757 (2008).
154. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 46.
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efficient. 155 Comparable situations have arisen in the past 156 and the results
have been poor. 157 Here, the FCC had no choice but to make an ex ante
decision regarding the merger, 158 but because an uncertainty problem
existed in the SDARS market, it was important for the Commission to at
least leave open the possibility that meaningful ex post monitoring of the
merger could be conducted. 159 Yet, there are two explanations why the
FCC’s approval of the Sirius-XM merger did not leave open this possibility.
One explanation for the impossibility of conducting a meaningful ex
post assessment of the Sirius-XM merger is that the FCC did not lower the
barriers to entry into the SDARS industry. Market entrants (even potential
ones) have the ability to impact post-merger prices. 160 Thus, if the
possibility existed for new firms to enter the SDARS industry, then Sirius
XM Radio Inc. might have felt pressure to lower their prices below the
price cap, 161 resulting in demand changes and quantitative data for
research. 162 However, an entrant into the SDARS industry would bear the
brunt of some very significant costs. For example, there are “significant
fixed costs of establishing a nationwide radio network.” 163 These costs, in
addition to the costs endured to develop technology, market products, and
develop a client base, exceeded $5 billion to both Sirius and XM. 164 There
are also the costs of acquiring spectrum that a new SDARS provider would
need to concern itself with. 165 Not only would a new SDARS company have
to purchase spectrum—an acquisition that cost both Sirius and XM more
than $83 million 166—but “because there is physically no other spectrum
allocated for SDARS, the acquisition of spectrum by an entrant would
155. Id. at 47–48.
156. See, e.g., FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F.Supp. 1285 (W.D. Mich. 1996).
157. The FTC lost in its request for an injunction to prevent the merger of Butterworth Health

Corporation and Blodgett Memorial Medical Center, the two largest acute care hospitals in Grand
Rapids, Michigan. Id. at 1288, 1303. The court accepted the FTC’s evidence that the proposed
merger would result in two near-monopolies yet it allowed the merger due to the “Community
Commitments” made, which included post-merger price regulations. Id. at 1294, 1298, 1302–03.
Later, studies would show that “several health plans believed that they were paying more . . . than
they most likely would have been absent the merger.” David Balto & Maleah Geertsma, Why
Hospital Merger Antitrust Enforcement Remains Necessary: A Retrospective on the Butterworth
Merger, 34 J. HEALTH L. 129, 154 (2001) (since renamed J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI.).
158. See 47 C.F.R. § 25.119(a) (“You must file an application for Commission authorization
before you can transfer, assign, dispose of (voluntarily or involuntarily, directly or indirectly, or
by transfer of control of any corporation or any other entity) your station license or accompanying
rights. The Commission will grant your application only if it finds that doing so will serve the
public interest, convenience and necessity.”).
159. See discussion supra Part II.C.
160. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 43, § 3.0.
161. See id.
162. See Froeb, Hosken & Pappalardo, supra note 135, at 366–67.
163. Sidak & Singer, supra note 83, at 736.
164. Corriero, supra note 21, at 426.
165. Sidak & Singer, supra note 83, at 736.
166. FCC Announces Auction Winners, supra note 27, at 18,727.
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entail not just buying spectrum, but also convincing the FCC to allocate
additional spectrum for an additional SDARS provider.” 167 Consequently,
because of these significant barriers, entry of a new SDARS provider is
highly unlikely.
A second explanation for the impossibility of conducting meaningful ex
post research of the merger is the impact of the price cap. In competitive
markets, when a seller makes the decision to adjust the price of its product,
the level at which that product is consumed will subsequently adjust as
well; if the seller decides to raise prices, then consumption will typically
fall, while if the seller reduces prices, consumption will typically rise. 168
Sellers might also adjust their prices in response to shifts in consumer
demand. 169 Typically, if demand rises, prices will follow. 170 On the other
hand, if demand falls, prices will be adjusted downward as well. 171 All of
these adjustments in prices and consumption produce quantitative data
which can be used to analyze such things as the substitutability of certain
goods and the boundaries of markets. 172 Thus, in a post-merger market
where prices and consumption can freely adjust to one-another, the
possibility of collecting quantitative data to conduct research is great.
Imposing a price cap, on the other hand, will impede these adjustments
from taking place. As a result, the data which is used to evaluate the
boundaries of markets and to measure the substitutability of different
products—information which can be used to solve market uncertainty—will
not be produced. The FCC’s decision to impose a price cap is therefore
flawed in that it fails to enlighten the FCC as to the SDARS market’s
elasticity and to alleviate the uncertainty problem that exists in the SDARS
industry.
D. CONCLUSION
The price cap relied on by the FCC is a flawed solution. Not only do
past experiences with price caps indicate that it will be ineffective,173 but it
is also against FCC policy 174 and will inhibit the government from learning
anything about the SDARS market that could benefit future policy
decisions. 175 It is thus readily clear that, when evaluating the merits of

167. Sidak & Singer, supra note 83, at 736.
168. See EDWIN MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 20–24 (3d ed.

1979).
169. Id. at 33–34.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See A. ASIMAKOPULOS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC THEORY: MICROECONOMICS
23–35 (1978).
173. See discussion supra Part II.A.
174. See discussion supra Part II.B.
175. See discussion supra Part II.C.
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proposed mergers that are plagued by uncertainty, regulatory agencies
would be ill advised to rest their approval upon any price caps.
III. PROPOSED POLICY FOR MERGERS PLAGUED BY
UNCERTAINTY
While the FCC erroneously based its decision to approve the Sirius-XM
merger on the voluntary price cap, not everyone shared the Commission’s
position on the appropriate remedy. Hoards of both proponents and
opponents of the merger advocated far simpler solutions—for the
proponents, it was outright approval of the merger; for the opponents, it was
outright rejection. While each side put forth meritorious arguments, when
faced with a market whose contours are uncertain, as is the case with
SDARS, neither position leads to an optimal outcome. Rather, the middle
ground—approving mergers and subsequently conducting ex post
evaluations—is the best solution in the face of uncertainty.
A. THE FLAW OF THE OUTRIGHT APPROVAL AND REJECTION
SOLUTIONS
When the Sirius-XM merger proposal was announced, over 17,000
formal and informal comments poured into the FCC advocating their
writers’ and constituencies’ positions. 176 Many of these statements argued
for outright approval of the merger because of the public interest benefits to
consumers. When horizontal mergers are consummated, oftentimes
efficiencies are generated which “can enhance the merged firm’s ability and
incentive to compete, . . . result[ing] in lower prices, improved quality,
enhanced services, or new products.” 177 These were some of the benefits
that the merger proponents, 178 the FCC, 179 and the DOJ foresaw. 180 In
176. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 15.
177. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 43, § 4.
178. Comment of American Trucking Associations, Inc., FCC MB Docket No. 07-57, June 21,

2007,
available
at
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_
document=6519559657 (“Combining their operations will result in savings for the two satellite
radio providers and will free up additional capacity on their systems.”); Comment of Americans
for
Tax
Reform,
FCC
MB
Docket
No.
07-57,
available
at
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6519533911
(lower prices); Comment of Circuit City Stores, Inc., FCC MB Docket No. 07-57, June 28, 2007,
available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=
6519537861 (improved offerings); Comment of General Motors Corporation, FCC MB Docket
No. 07-57, Dec. 4, 2007, available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf
=pdf&id_document=6519816756 (programming packages at lower prices); Comment of National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, FCC MB Docket No. 07-57, June 20, 2007,
available
at
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document
=6519558853 (lower prices).
179. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 44–46.
180. DOJ Decision, supra note 1, at 4 (“[T]he Division estimated the likely variable cost
savings—those savings most likely to be passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices to be
substantial. For example, the merger is likely to allow the parties to consolidate development,
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addition, efficiencies from horizontal mergers sometimes “result in benefits
in the form of new or improved products.” 181 Proponents of the merger
foresaw these efficiencies as another public interest benefit for
consumers, 182 as did the FCC. 183 There were additional proponents of the
merger who advocated for outright approval based on the financial
difficulties of Sirius and XM, 184 but because the Applicants “did not seek
approval on the basis of financial distress,” the FCC did not take this into
consideration. 185
On the opposite end of the spectrum are those who advocated for the
outright rejection of the merger. When markets become highly concentrated
with just a small number of firms, the capacity of those firms to increase
prices and decrease output (including innovation) rises. 186 The proponents
of outright rejection believed their remedy to be the most beneficial to the
public interest because it would preserve market competition, thus
inhibiting the ability of the firms to raise prices. 187 It is clear that this was
production and distribution efforts on a single line of radios and thereby eliminate duplicative
costs and realize economies of scale. These efficiencies alone likely would be sufficient to
undermine an inference of competitive harm.”).
181. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 43, § 4.
182. Comment of American Trucking Associations, Inc., supra note 178 (“The proposed
merger will . . . expand choices for all consumers, including truckers.”); Comment of Americans
for Tax Reform, supra note 178 (“Sirius and XM have shown in their public filings and
congressional testimony that a combined satellite radio company will expand consumer
programming choices.”); Comment of Circuit City Stores, Inc., supra note 178 (“Sirius and XM
have indicated that the combined company will offer a wider range of program packages.”);
Comment of General Motors Corporation, supra note 178 (“General Motors believes the proposed
merger is and will be in the public interest because the merged company will be able to offer
consumers expanded programming choices and a broad range of service packages.”); Comment of
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, supra note 178 (“Over time, as the
companies consolidate duplicate programming, they can better use capacity on their system to
offer even more unique and diverse programming to underserved populations.”).
183. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 38–39.
184. See Comments of Edwin Meese, III & James L. Gattuso, FCC MB Docket No. 07-57, July
9,
2007,
available
at
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=
pdf&id_document=6519546849.
185. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 97 (Copps, Comm’r, dissenting).
186. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 43, § 2.0.
187. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 96–97 (Copps, Comm’r, dissenting); id. at 98–103
(Adelstein, Comm’r, dissenting); Comment of Members of Congress to Alberto R. Gonzales,
Kevin J. Martin, & Deborah Platt Majoras, FCC MB Docket No. 07-57, June 18, 2007, available
at
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6519533318
(stating the merger would “create a monopoly which would be devastating to consumers.”);
Comment of North Carolina Association of Broadcasters to Kevin J. Martin, June 25, 2007,
available
at
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document
=6519538863 (stating that competition will cease to exist in SDARS if Sirius and XM are
permitted to merge); Declaration of J. Gregory Sidak filed by The Consumer Coalition for
Competition in Satellite Radio (C3SR), Mar. 28, 2007, 34, available at
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6519008261
(“SDARS represent a distinct product market. Hence, the proposed merger of the only two
SDARS providers would constitute a merger to monopoly.”); Informal Objection of Prometheus
Radio Project, U.S. Public Interest Research Group, & Media Access Project, FCC MB Docket
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the solution advocated by FCC Commissioners Copps and Adelstein, 188 and
it would have been the winning position had just one additional
commissioner sided with them. 189
Despite the potential merits of each of these positions, both solutions
are flawed when there is uncertainty about the parameters and dynamics of
the relevant markets. Proponents of merger approval assume that the merger
will not result in a monopoly and proponents of merger rejection assume
that the merger will result in a monopoly, but neither of these outcomes is
even more probable than the other when the information before the
regulator is insufficient to delineate the relevant markets. The proponents of
outright approval emphasized the great public interest benefits that would
arise from the efficiencies generated by the Sirius-XM merger; however, if
their implicit assumption that the merger will not result in a monopoly or
near-monopoly is false, then those efficiency gains are moot. 190 On the
other side, the outright rejection proponents emphasized the need to reject
the merger in order to preserve competition and prevent monopolization. 191
However, if their assumption that the merger will result in a monopoly or
near-monopoly is incorrect, then this remedy will have deprived consumers
of the potential benefits of efficiency gains by preventing the merger.
B. PROPOSAL: MERGER APPROVAL CONDITIONED UPON
SUBSEQUENT EX POST MONITORING AND EVALUATIONS
1. Rationale
While both the proponents and opponents of the Sirius-XM merger
made strong arguments in support of their positions, when the parameters of
No. 07-57, July 9, 2007, available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=
pdf&id_document=6519541586 (stating that satellite radio is a distinct product and that allowing
the merger will “reduce competition in all aspects, including price, service, choice, and
innovation.”); Petition to Deny of Common Cause, Consumer Federation of America, Consumers
Union and Free Press, FCC MB Docket No. 07-57, July 9, 2007, available at
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6519546595
(“Allowing the merger will eliminate that competitive dynamic and unleash market power to
abuse customers.”).
188. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 96–97 (Copps, Comm’r, dissenting); see also id. at 98–103
(Adelstein, Comm’r, dissenting).
189. Republican Commissioner Deborah Taylor Tate represented the undecided swing vote.
Peter Kaplan, Republican FCC Commissioner Key to XM-Sirius Vote, REUTERS, July 1, 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/industryNews/idUSN0126213820080702.
She
expressed
reservations about the merger but in the end voted to approve it alongside her fellow Republican
Commissioners. FCC Decision, supra note 8, at 104–08 (Tate, Comm’r, concurring); Kaplan,
supra note 189.
190. Despite efficiency gains realized by the merged entity, consumers would not be better off
if the merger is “to monopoly” because then the merged entity could utilize its market power and
increase prices. See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 43, § 4 (“Efficiencies almost never
justify a merger to monopoly or near-monopoly.”).
191. See generally id.
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the concerned product and geographic markets are uncertain, such
arguments should be considered good guesses at best. 192 It is entirely
possible that the proponents of approving the merger outright will be
proven correct in predicting that market efficiencies created by the merger
will benefit consumers, 193 but it is also probable that the merger will result
in a monopoly 194 or that the impact of the merger will be something nobody
could have predicted ex ante. The bottom line is, given the level of
uncertainty, there is no way of knowing ex ante what the impact of the
settled-upon remedy will be. For this reason, in situations where the market
parameters cannot be defined, a compromise between the outright approval
and outright rejection positions may be the best solution. Such a solution is
merger approval conditioned upon subsequent ex post monitoring and
evaluations (Approval and Monitoring Remedy).
The policy of conditioning antitrust remedies on ex post evaluations is
not a new one. As of late, there has been an increased willingness of
regulators to intervene in closed mergers to consider novel remedies or
approaches. 195 A prime example of such an action was the reliance on ex
post evaluations in the merger of Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp.
(ENH) and Highland Park Hospital (Highland Park). 196 In 2000, ENH,
which owned two hospitals in the north-Chicago suburbs (Evanston
Hospital and Glenbrook Hospital), acquired a third hospital in the area
(Highland Park). 197 Two years later, on August 28, 2002, the FTC
“announced the formation of the Merger Litigation Task Force,”
“responsible for reinvigorating the Commission’s hospital merger program,
which include[d] a review of, and potential challenge to, consummated
transactions that may have resulted in anticompetitive price increases.” 198
Pursuant to this “hospital-merger retrospective-review,” the FTC filed a
complaint against the ENH-Highland Park merger in February 2004.199
Using ex post evidence that, during the years since the merger was
consummated, ENH had “raised its prices by significantly more than
comparable hospitals because of market power gained through the

192.
193.
194.
195.

Bhagwat, supra note 124, at 1319.
See discussion supra Part III.A.
See discussion supra Part III.A.
Dany H. Assaf & Sarah K. McLean, It’s Not Over Until It’s Over: When is the Deal Really
Done?, 23 ANTITRUST 59, 59 (2008).
196. In re Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., 2005 WL 2845790 (FTC Oct. 20, 2005), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 2007 WL 2286195 (FTC Aug. 6, 2007).
197. Ober Kaler, Observations and Lessons from the FTC’s Evanston Northwestern Healthcare
Hospital-Merger Decision, 20 No. 1 HEALTH L. 24, 24 (Oct. 2007).
198. Press Release, FTC, Federal Trade Commission Announces Formation of Merger
Litigation Task Force (Aug. 28, 2002), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/08/mergerlitigation.shtm.
199. Jeff Miles, Analyzing the Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Initial Decision, ANTITRUST
HEALTH CARE CHRON., Jan. 2006, available at http://www.ober.com/shared_resources/news/
published/health/pub_health_010106a.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).
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merger,” 200 the FTC successfully proved that ENH had violated § 7 of the
Clayton Act by making an acquisition that substantially lessened
competition. 201
The use of ex post monitoring has not been limited to merger remedies.
For instance, it has been implemented as part of a remedy to an illegal
monopolization claim against Microsoft. In 1994, the U.S. government
began a series of antitrust battles with Microsoft.202 The government’s
prosecution was based on Microsoft’s “attempt[s] to forestall the growth of
middleware applications,” such as the Netscape Browser and the Java
Virtual Machine, through various practices. 203 The government claimed
Microsoft had violated § 2 of the Sherman Act 204 “through its practices
directed at Netscape and Java . . . aiming to protect its operating system
monopoly by extinguishing the threat that the middleware applications
could undermine or replace the ubiquitous Windows operating system.” 205
Ultimately, Microsoft was found liable by the D.C. Circuit; 206 however,
instead of continuing the litigation to the remedial stage, the DOJ
negotiated a remedial decree with Microsoft 207 which included an elaborate
ex post monitoring system to ensure that Microsoft complied, but also to
evaluate future developments in the relevant markets. 208
Despite the use of ex post monitoring in merger cases such as Evanston,
the Approval and Monitoring Remedy is not without its faults. One flaw is
that such a policy could require approving mergers that will lead to the
formation of a monopoly or near-monopoly, thus realizing in the short run
all the fears of those who advocated for the outright rejection of the SiriusXM merger. 209 Also, judicial reversals of mergers could give rise to “a state
of uncertainty . . . . Such a situation of uncertainty lasting a number of
months or even years could have negative effects on the participating
undertakings and on the markets generally.” 210
The adverse consequences that the Approval and Monitoring Remedy
could have are real, but they are dwarfed by the positive effects. Under the
proposed policy, it is possible mergers may be allowed that will lead to
200. Id.
201. 15 U.S.C. § 18; In re Evanston, 2007 WL 2286195, at Section V.A.
202. Amanda Cohen, Surveying the Microsoft Antitrust Universe, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 333,

333 n.1 (2004).
203. Yane Svetiev, Antitrust Governance: The New Wave of Antitrust, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 593,
664–65 (2007).
204. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2004).
205. Svetiev, supra note 203, at 665.
206. United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
207. Svetiev, supra note 203, at 667.
208. United States v. Microsoft Corp., CA No. 98-1232 (CKK) (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 2002);
Svetiev, supra note 203, at 668.
209. See supra text accompanying note 187.
210. Case C-413/06 P. Bertelsmann AG v. Sony BMG Music Entm’t, 2007 WL 4334882, at
para. 83 (E.C.R. Dec. 13, 2007).
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monopolies or near monopolies, but such monopolizations will be shortlived because the regulator can implement corrective measures in such
cases. Furthermore, the negative impact of creating uncertainty in the
market will be outweighed by the positive impact of improved outcomes for
consumers, which this policy is best positioned to accomplish. While ex
ante merger decisions in uncertain markets can only use pre-merger
evidence to make predictions about the proposed merger’s potential
impact, 211 the Approval and Monitoring Remedy can use the “evidence of
the merger’s actual effects on a market.” 212 “In particular, the courts [will]
be able to scrutinize the merged entity’s behavior for any anticompetitive
signs in a post-merger environment” and “[t]he agencies [will] also have
more opportunity to conduct probative economic studies and seek evidence
from affected customers, suppliers, and competitors.” 213 Thus, after ex post
assessments, regulatory agencies will be far better situated to evaluate
mergers.
This approach also includes two additional advantages. First,
reevaluations based on ex post studies “may translate into longer and more
‘bullet proof’ reviews that are more likely to withstand challenges in courts
as well as in the public domain.” 214 Second, as was previously demonstrated
by the studies of the FTC’s Bureau of Economics, the policy could help
guide and improve future policy decisions by providing regulators with
useful information about the impact of their previously implemented
policies. 215 For all these reasons, the benefits of the Approval and
Monitoring Remedy outweigh its flaws.
2. Implementation
The process of implementing the Approval and Monitoring Remedy
requires four steps: (1) determine that there is a sufficient level of ex ante
uncertainty; (2) approve the proposed merger; (3) conduct an ex post
assessment of the consummated merger; and (4) take action based on the
results of the ex post assessments. First, a determination that the product
and geographic markets of the merging firms cannot be delineated is one
possible finding that would establish an uncertainty problem. If the markets
can be delineated, then there is no uncertainty problem and the regulatory
agency can make its determination as to approving or rejecting the proposed
merger as it sees fit.
After establishing that an uncertainty problem exists, the second step in
the process is to approve the merger. 216 However, the regulator should have
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Kovacic, supra note 121, at 846.
Assaf & McLean, supra note 195, at 60–61.
Id. at 61.
Id.
Froeb, Hosken & Pappalardo, supra note 135, at 371; Kovacic, supra note 121, at 846–47.
The rationale for approving the merger was discussed in Part III.B.1.
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the freedom to err on the side of caution if there are strong reasons for
doing so. For example, in a merger environment where there is a large
consumer base and it is believed that there are no product substitutes, a
regulator should have the freedom to reject the merger outright. On the
other hand, in a situation such as Sirius-XM where it is likely that terrestrial
radio is a viable substitute for satellite radio, the regulator should approve
the merger at this stage.
Merger approval is followed by the third step: conducting ex post
monitoring and assessment of the consummated merger. The goal of these
assessments is to determine the impacts of the merger that could not be
anticipated ex ante, including any anticompetitive impact. Quantitative data,
such as variations in retail price, must be gathered to determine the precise
anticompetitive impact of the merger, 217 but qualitative data concerning the
anticompetitive impacts of the merger, such as testimonial evidence from
customers, suppliers, executives, and competitors, can be used as well. 218
How the ex post assessments are to be conducted is for the regulatory
agency to determine. The agency can conduct the assessment itself or it can
devise a process similar to the one created by the DOJ for the Microsoft
settlement in which third parties and expert committees were involved. 219 In
that situation, the DOJ monitored Microsoft through multiple channels,
including peer evaluators (“a court appointed technical committee of
experts”), 220 Microsoft’s own internal compliance unit, and a joint status
reporting system with reports produced by both the DOJ and Microsoft that
“describ[ed] and evaluat[ed] Microsoft’s compliance with the remedy
decree.” 221 The advantages of this method include the ability to tap into the
“on-the-ground expertise” of third parties, to “promote[] learning by all
who are involved in the process,” and to adjust strategies based on the
content of the status reports. 222
The final step of the Approval and Monitoring Remedy consists of
evaluating the ex post assessments and taking appropriate action based on
the results. The ex post assessments could lead to a finding that the merger
had no anticompetitive impact or that it did. If the ex post evaluations show
that approving the merger had no anticompetitive impact, then it should be
217. Froeb, Hosken & Pappalardo, supra note 135, at 366; see, e.g., Miles, supra note 199 (The
Evanston Hospital merger was deemed anticompetitive after an ex post assessment produced
quantitative pricing data which showed that Evanston Hospital had significantly raised its prices
after merging with Highland Park Hospital).
218. Assaf & McLean, supra note 195, at 61 (regulatory agencies could “seek evidence from
affected customers, suppliers, and competitors.”); Froeb, Hosken & Pappalardo, supra note 135, at
366–67 (“[I]n most merger investigations, economists rely on qualitative data, like marketing
documents and testimonial evidence from customers, company executives, and competitors.”).
219. Svetiev, supra note 203, at 681.
220. Id. at 669.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 680.

538

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 3

left alone. However, if an anticompetitive impact is seen in the assessments,
the regulatory agency has the option to impose either a structural remedy or
a conduct remedy. 223 Structural remedies “generally will involve the sale of
physical assets by the merging firms” while “conduct remed[ies] usually
entail[] injunctive provisions that would, in effect, manage or regulate the
merged firm’s postmerger business conduct.” 224 Structural remedies are the
preferred remedy of the DOJ in merger cases since, compared to conduct
remedies, “they are relatively clean and certain, and generally avoid costly
government entanglement in the market.” 225 Moreover, structural remedies
are the normal remedy for a consummated but anticompetitive merger, as
divestitures often may be used “to restore the status quo.” 226
Despite regulatory agencies’ preference for structural remedies, there
have been instances where conduct remedies have been used instead to curb
the anticompetitive effects of a consummated merger. For example, the
remedy that the FTC employed after successfully challenging the Evanston
Hospital merger was a conduct remedy. 227 Originally, Administrative Law
Judge Stephen J. McGuire found in favor of the FTC and held that
“divestiture [was] the most effective and appropriate remedy.” 228
Accordingly, he ruled that ENH must sell Highland Park. 229 However, the
divestiture McGuire mandated was vacated on appeal in favor of a conduct
remedy. 230 Rather than force ENH to divest itself from Highland Park, the
FTC mandated that ENH and Highland Park negotiate separately with
payors and that they also have separate negotiating teams to compete with
one another. 231 This switch from a structural remedy to a conduct remedy
was made because the FTC felt that divestiture would be too difficult to
implement since “the hospitals had been integrated for over seven years and
. . . the quality improvements and efficiencies from the merger would be
lost.” 232 Still, the FTC emphasized that conduct remedies should only be
used on a very limited basis and that “[d]ivestiture is the preferred remedy
for challenges to unlawful mergers.” 233 Hence, if ex post evaluations of the
merger show an anticompetitive effect, a structural remedy should be
employed to account for such effect unless, in the regulator’s judgment, it
would be too difficult to implement.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

VIII.

See Policy Guide to Merger Remedies, supra note 100, at Part III.
Id.
Id.
Kaler, supra note 197, at 25.
See In re Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., 2007 WL 2286195, (FTC Aug. 6, 2007), at Sec.

228. In re Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., 2005 WL 2845790 (FTC Oct. 20, 2005), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 2007 WL 2286195 (FTC Aug. 6, 2007), at Sec. III.F.2.
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231. Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The FCC committed a serious error by relying on a voluntary price cap
in its approval of the Sirius-XM merger. Not only is the cap deficient on its
own terms since it applies only to retail prices and has a 36-month
enforcement period, but it has an added negative impact when applied in the
satellite radio industry, an industry with uncertain market boundaries—it
inhibits the resolution of the uncertainty problem by eliminating the
possibility of price changes that could have produced data for analysis.
Ex post assessments of mergers are vital to learn about competition in
markets and to improve antitrust policies, and they should be the focal point
when evaluating merger proposals in markets plagued by uncertainty.
Rather than basing its approval of the Sirius-XM merger on a voluntary
price cap, the FCC should have permitted the merger without imposing
conditions. Subsequently, the FCC should have conducted ex post
assessments of the merger to determine whether it had any anticompetitive
effect, and if such effects were found, then the FCC could have imposed
structural or conduct remedies to reverse those effects. By following this
regulatory path, the FCC would have assured itself of making the proper
decision and, at the same time, it would have attenuated the uncertainty
problem plaguing the market.
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